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The purpose of this study is to analyse the factors of continuity and 
identity in the parties around Queen Marie de Medici and Queen Anne of 
Austria in the period between 1600 and 1666. During the first half of the 17th 
century, the evolution of the parties around the queens varied significantly 
according to their status (queen consort, mother of the heir or regent).1Recent 
historiography by Jean-François Dubost,2 Chantal Grell3 and Fanny Cosandey 
considered how, as early as the time of their weddings, women rulers 
intervened in politics: 
 
The woman ruler has a duty to be present in the very places of 
power, within a court which is also the centre of a political world, 
over which any power is forbidden to her, but which she is not 
spared from attending. Already tricky in itself, this situation is 
made more difficult for her by the place which she occupies at 
the side of the King given that her matrimonial bonds turn her 
into a major component of the political exchequer.4 
 
While their work is mostly focused on the Spanish world, the research of 
Jean-Pierre Dedieu 5  and José Martínez Millán 6  allowed a better 
understanding of the clientelist functioning of factions at the court. The same 
can be said of Alain Hugon's analysis of Spanish diplomacy’s role over this 
period.7 
 
Over a reasonably continuous timeline, both Marie of Medici and Anne of 
Austria directed regencies for a minor King. They came from two different 
dynasties: the Medici of Florence and the Habsburg of Spain, and therefore 
approached their respective regencies in different ways. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 About the parties, Norbert Elias, La société de cour (Paris: Flammarion, 1985), 189. See 
also Jacques Heers, Les Partis and la vie politique dans l’Occident médiéval (Paris: PUF, 
1981). About the evolution of queens in politics, Fanny Cosandey, La reine de France, 
symbole et pouvoir (Paris: Gallimard, 2000), 271 and 295. 
2 Jean-François Dubost, Marie de Médicis, la reine dévoilée (Paris: Payot, 2009).  
3 Chantal Grell, ed., Anne d’Autriche, Infante d’Espagne et Reine de France (Paris: Perrin, 
2009). 
4 Ibidem, 379. 
5 Jean-Pierre Dedieu, Réseaux, familles et pouvoirs dans le monde ibérique à la fin de 
l’Ancien Régime (Paris: CNRS editions, 1998). 
6 José Martínez Millán, Instituciones y elites de poder en la monarquía hispánica durante el 
siglo XVI (Madrid: Ediciones de la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 1992). 
7  Alain Hugon, Au service du roi catholique: « honorables ambassadeurs » et « divins 
espions », représentation diplomatique et service secret dans les relations hispano-françaises 
de 1598 à 1635 (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2004). 
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This contribution aims to answer the following questions: what are the 
factors of similarity and continuity of parties at the court of France? What kind 
of relationship did these parties have with the two queens, Marie de Medici 
and Anne of Austria? To what extent did these parties have any influence on 
French politics? 
 
These questions are of great importance because the progress of 
parties at the court determined not only the development of the monarchy 
itself as an institution, but also France’s foreign policy in the first half of the 
17th century.  
 
 
II. The Parties at the Court of Marie de Medici (1600-1642) 
 
II.1. 1600-1610: Rivalries and Political Clientelism around the Household 
of Marie de Medici 
 
As highlighted by David Hume's analysis,8 divisions between parties in 
the 17th century were not founded so much on differences of opinion as on 
personal hostility, carried over several generations by the great families of the 
nobility. Each of the houses wanted not so much to monopolise the king's 
power but rather to share it with him in the manner of great vassals.9  
 
At the court of Paris in 1600, rivalries between courtesans were not 
determined by religious issues (for instance the Duke of Guise, a Catholic, 
was a great friend of Protestant Sully10) but on clannish rivalries, inherited 
from the Wars of Religion. This is what Alain Hugon calls the 
«deconfessionalization of nobiliary strategies».11 Indeed, since the beginning 
of religious tensions between Catholics and Protestants in the 17th century, 
two noble clans had opposed each other at the court: the princes of Condé, 
leaders of the Protestants, and the Dukes of Guise, leaders of the Catholic 
Party. Henri, Prince of Condé and his uncles, Louis of Bourbon and the Prince 
of Conti, were declared opponents to the marriage between Henry IV and 
Marie of Medici because such marriage meant for them to lose their 
inheritance rights.12 For this very reason, the Guises were favourable to the 
union.13   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 David Hume, “Of parties in General,” (1742), in his Essay, Moral and Literary, Part I, essay 
VIII (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund INC, 1987), 
http://www.econlib.org/library/LFBooks/Hume/hmMPL.html (consulted on 4 May 2015). Also 
see Dedieu, Réseaux, familles et pouvoirs, 50-51. 
9 On that subject see Elias, La société de cour, 189-190.  
10 Dubost, Marie de Médicis, 314. 
11 Hugon, Au service du roi catholique, 324. 
12 Despite indecision and political and religious about-turn of the head of the family Antoine de 
Bourbon, the Condé distinguish themselves as the leaders of the Protestant parties during the 
religious wars, thanks to Antoine’s younger brother, Louis of Condé, and later to Condé’s 
son, Henry of Condé. See Dubost, Marie de Médicis, 785. 
13 Marie of Medici was thus encouraged to carefully cultivate her own dynastic links with the 
house of Lorraine. That strategy was greatly facilitated by the affinity, which grew due to a 
simple question of age, between Louise-Marguerite of Guise and Marie of Medici. Ibidem, 115. 
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When Marie of Medici arrived in France in 1600 on the occasion of her 
wedding, she learned about the parties within the court, as well as about the 
members of her household. The choice of the court members was Henry IV’s 
decision, but his ministers and mistresses could also express their views. 
Marie of Medici’s household was composed of four hundred and twenty 
people, riddled with army officers, who owed their nomination to her rival, 
Henriette of Entragues, the former mistress of the King, whose intrigues had 
led to two plots involving Spain over two years.14  
 
This particular context raised for Marie of Medici the alarming question 
of her children’s safety.15 Indeed, Henry IV had a broad sense of family: he 
chose to have all his children, legitimate and illegitimate alike, brought up at 
Saint-Germain castle. The Queen feared that the royal mistresses would 
poison her children, as evidenced by her correspondence with their governess, 
the Baroness of Montbazon.16 
 
Marie of Medici’s survival instinct was crucially important at court in the 
context of conflicts between factions that put her and her descendants at risk. 
For that reason, the Queen had to position herself as a patron at the head of a 
network of men and women devoted to her service. Until 1609 there was not 
any real 'party of the Queen' in the political sense of the term, because the 
Queen did not have any political autonomy, but she endeavoured to patiently 
conquer significant spaces of influence. Thus, Marie of Medici did not have 
the right to directly appoint the members of her household but at least had 
succeeded in obtaining the power to nominate substitute members in case of 
an officer’s death or resignation. 17  Marie of Medici did not rely on the 
conventional groups of the nobility and the clergy, which were more 
autonomous and consequently less reliable. She selected from her staff some 
agents of modest origin whose promotion she personally made possible. 
Denis Barbot presented La Fontaine as an example. He began as a cabinet 
servant and fourteen years later became an usher in the cabinet. When Marie 
of Medici was held prisoner in Blois in 1617, La Fontaine proved sufficiently 
discreet to be entrusted with various courier missions in Paris.18 In 1618, most 
likely to reward him for his services, La Fontaine was a table companion, 
eating at the tables of the household.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14  In 1602, Henriette of Entragues plotted with several powerful men: the Duke of 
Montmorency, the Duke of Espernon, the Duke of Bouillon, and the Prince of Joinville, the 
Duke of Guise's younger brother. The project was to assassinate the King and then to 
dismantle the kingdom to the profit of both the great nobles and Spain. In 1604 Henriette of 
Entragues returned to her intrigues with Spain and was supported by the Count of Auvergne, 
who was her half-brother and the natural son of Charles IX. Dubost, Marie de Médicis, 113-
114; Hugon, Au service du roi catholique, 174, 318-319. 
15 In eight years (from 1601 to 1609), Marie of Medici gave birth to five children (Elisabeth, 
Louis, Gaston, Christine and Henriette), which reinforced her prestige at court. 
16 BNF, ms 3811: lettres de Marie de Médicis à ses enfants. 
17 Dubost, Marie de Médicis, 249.  
18 Ibidem, 158. 
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In order to establish her clientele, the Queen also carefully chose the 
godparents for the baptism of her protégées.19 She also endeavoured to 
create unions between families of Italian origin and from the French elite, as 
with the Bonsis and the Bartolinis.  
 
In order to gain the support of the financial circles, Marie of Medici 
entrusted her income to two among the top families of the Parisian gentry: the 
Potiers and the Harlays. 20  For ecclesiastical appointments, the Queen 
favoured the officers and families of her household.21 
 
When the King was murdered in 1609, Marie of Medici was appointed 
Regent of the kingdom. At that time, she had an important clientele among 
her staff, the financial, and the judiciary circles. However, her political line 
regarding the parties of nobility was yet to be defined. 
 
II.2 1610-1617: The Regency: Marie of Medici against Henri, Prince of 
Condé 
 
The status of regent is politically fragile, as noted by Fanny 
Cosandey.22 The transference of regency essentially relied on the political 
context,23 that is to say, on the balance of power between the pretenders to 
the throne and the historical precedents.24  The political weakness of the 
Regent did not lie in the powers granted to her, but in the balance of power 
which she had to maintain, operating within the limits of governance. This 
situation led her to act as a party leader, seeking alliances and creating new 
loyalties. The regency's mission in itself demanded the transmission of an 
unimpaired inheritance to the future King.25 The political direction usually 
defining regency was a conservative one which involved the pursuit of both 
interior and exterior peace. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Such as that of Ginevra Rinuccini, and a daughter of the Duke of Bouillon named Marie. 
Ibidem, 256. 
20 Three sons of Nicolas Potiers of Blancmesnil presided over the Court of Auditors and at the 
Queen's Council between 1610 and 1616. Achille de Harlay, the Marquis of Bréval, was the 
favourite intermediary of the Queen in her correspondence with the House of Lorraine. Marie 
obtained the archbishopric of Rouen for a Harley. Ibidem, 262. 
21 In 1604 she obtained from the Curia that her premier ecuyer, Bréhaut, Sieur de la Roche, 
could run an abbey in Brittany. Because she was a Medici princess, the Queen’s patronage 
could reveal efficient and both the Cardinals Sourdis and Joyeuse got closer to her, certainly 
for that reason. On that point see Bénédicte Lecarpentier, “La reine diplomate: Marie de 
Médicis et les cours italiennes,” in Femmes et pouvoir politique, les princesses d’Europe, 
XVe-XVIIe siècle, ed. Isabelle Poutrin and Marie-Karine Schaub (Paris: Bréal, 2007), 183-192. 
22 Cosandey, La reine de France, 317-318.  
23 A decree from 1407 established the rule of male transmission and recalled the custom to 
grant the regency to the Queen mother in order to guarantee against the risk of usurpation. It 
limited the Regent's power and the duration of her mission to the King's fourteenth year, that 
is, to his majority. Despite that decree, the Queen mother needed the support of the 
parliament and of the princes of the blood to govern. See Gérard Sabatier and Sylvène 
Edouard, Les monarchies de France et d’Espagne, 1556-1715 (Paris: Armand Colin, 2001), 
152. 
24 On that point see Pierre Dupuy, Traité de la majorité de nos Rois et des régences du 
Royaume (Paris: 1655), 268-269, as well as Félix Olivier-Martin, “La Régences et la majorité 
des rois (1060-1375)” (Doctoral Thesis, University of Paris, 1931). 
25 Cosandey, La reine de France, 309. 
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Thus Marie of Medici sought to neutralise the monarchies which had 
traditionally been enemies of France - Spain, England - in exchange for 
alliances with her daughters, and in order to tighten the bonds with the 
Curia.26 With regard to internal politics, the Queen mother provided some 
guarantees to both Catholics 27  and Protestants, 28  but civil peace was 
compromised by the opposition which the Prince of Condé led between 1610 
and 1614. Like any monarch invested with power, the Queen had both 
political and personal preferences, which prompted her to favour some 
Grandees over others. From 1613, Marie of Medici offered her trust to her 
servant Leonora Galigai as well as to her husband, Concino Concini.29  
 
The Prince of Condé, however, refused to be kept aside from power by 
the Regent. He disputed the project of the double Spanish marriages, which 
had been planned for Louis XIII with the infanta Anne of Austria, and for 
Elisabeth of Bourbon with Prince Philip.30 Jean-François Dubost states that 
between 1610 and 1616 Condé would have snatched away over three million 
of livres from the crown.31 Condé gathered around him the Duke of Nevers, 
the Duke of Vendôme – who was the half-brother of Louis XIII –, the Duke of 
Bouilllon, and the Duke of Longueville. The coalition looked like an unsatisfied 
family clan.  
 
While proclaiming the majority of Louis XIII in October 1614, Marie of 
Medici obtained from Parliament the right to continue to govern as the 
Council's Chief. The Spanish weddings took place in 1615. Her authority 
came out reinforced, but she nonetheless decided to get Condé arrested on 1 
September 1616. This decision proved a strategic error that precipitated the 
kingdom a step further into civil war. The oldest noble families (the Guises, 
the Gondis, Epernons and Montmorencys) abandoned the court of the Queen 
mother. The new war resulted in the edict of Loudun in 1616, compelling 
Marie of Medici to share the power with Condé, who became the new head of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Marie of Medici's three daughters guaranteed her strong alliances in Europe: Elisabeth in 
Spain, Christine in Savoy and Henriette in England. The alliance with England 
counterbalanced the Spanish alliance and allowed to buy a temporary 'diplomatic peace'.  
27 The Catholics were Marie of Medici's allies because they saw her as the instrument to 
definitely bring the King to support the Catholic cause. Such was the position of the State 
Secretary Villeroy, of historiographist Pierre Matthieu and Jesuit Poussevin, of the Gondis, 
and of the Guises. Dubost, Marie de Médicis, 265. 
28 Ibidem, 316. 
29 If Henri IV let Marie of Medici exercise her influence on the function and the naturalisation 
of Leonora Galigai Concini in the court, it was because of an agreement between Marie of 
Medici and Henriette of Entragues. In exchange, the royal mistress would be tolerated in the 
court. Ibidem, 480. About Concini, see Hélène Duccini, Concini: grandeur et misère du favori 
de Marie de Médicis (Paris: Albin Michel, 1991). 
30 See Hugon, Au service du roi catholique, 354. 
31 Dubost, Marie de Médicis, 431. Norbert Elias states in his study that the growing number of 
revolts among the nobility in the first half of the 17th century was also due to social changes. 
Imports of metals from overseas and the increase in the means of payment resulted in 
considerable depreciation of the currency and a decrease in purchasing power. This situation 
affected the nobility, compelling them to find other means of subsistence on top of their 
annuities. Elias, La société de cour, 161. 
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Finance in the kingdom. At that time, the party of Condé seemed to have won 
over that of the Queen. 
 
In 1617, the assassination of Concini ordered by Louis XIII, changed 
radically the French political chessboard. From that time on, Marie of Medici 
no longer had the King's favour and lost much of her political autonomy.  
 
II.3. 1619-1622: the Wars between the Mother and the Son 
 
The Queen’s household, the court and the parliaments were purged by 
the Duke of Luynes, Louis XIII’s new advisor. Luynes logically chose to rely 
on the main opponent to Concini and Marie de Medici: the Prince of Condé. 
Marie of Medici was sent into exile to Blois. She had lost her power but she 
kept her money, her servants and her status.32 
 
Consequently, the relationship of Marie of Medici with the great nobles 
changed radically because the Queen mother had to position herself as the 
leader of the discontents in order to return to power. According to Jean-
François Dubost, she supported  
 
their financial interests, their ideology and their rhetoric, by 
positioning herself as the “natural adviser” to the King: a vast 
scope because the progress of parties at the court determined 
the progress of monarchy as an institution.33 
 
In 1617 the Queen mother defended the participation of the great 
nobles in the government. 34  In 1619, she escaped from Blois with the 
complicity of her personal staff: La Mazures, Rucellais, Chanteloubes. 
 
Between 1619 and 1620 the three wars called 'of the mother and the 
son' took place. Marie of Medici was supported by the Western half of France, 
that is, the provinces where the Queen mother had most developed her 
networks and her financial interests.35 This series of wars resembled the 
many conflicts opposing the aristocrats to a Regent. Every episode ended up 
in a treaty in which the King granted his forgiveness and the rebels gained 
significant advantages. The last episode in July 1620 ended up with the 
submission of Normandy to Louis XIII and the success of the negotiations 
reconciling mother and son.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Dubost, Marie de Médicis, 586. 
33 Ibidem, 604. 
34 In order to justify the ‘unnatural' character of their opposition to the King, Marie of Medici's 
propagandists, such as Mathieu of Morgues, sought models of shared power between the 
mother and the son and of the advisory role of the Queen mother. They found their main 
inspiration in Blanche of Castille. Mathieu de Morgues, Diverses pièces pour la défense de la 
reyne mère du roy tres chrestien Louis XIII (s.l.: n.d.), 16.  
35 Her supporters included the Dukes of Bouillon and of Epernon, the Count of Soissons and 
his mother Anne of Montafié, the Duke of Mayenne as well as Retz, Roannez, Rohan, 
Montmorency and Coligny-Châtillon, then the Duke of Nemours, and the Knight of Vendôme. 
She also relied on the support of Protestants like Rohan, La Trémoille, Roquelaure, Coligny. 
Dubost, Marie de Médicis, 612. 
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Jean du Plessis, who was the bishop of Luçon, became the Queen 
mother’s protégé as she considered that she owed him her reconciliation with 
the King. To thank him, she obtained for him the cardinal's biretta and since 
then he was known as Cardinal Richelieu.36 The departure of Condé for Italy 
gave a free hand to Marie de Medici’s supporters at the court.37 However, this 
reconciliation had a price: Marie of Medici returned to the Council but only as 
a member and after the death of Luynes in December 1621. What’s more, she 
was compelled to abandon her main supporters in 1622: Villesavin, 
Chantelouble and La Marks, as well as the Count of Braine, Rucellai and the 
Maulny brothers.38  
 
 
II.4. 1622-1630: New Struggles between Factions and New Factions: The 
Accession of Richelieu 
 
The divisions between members of the royal family suited the court 
factions. Richelieu became the chief minister in 1624. In order to bring back 
political stability, he applied himself to slashing the power of factions by using 
his own clientele and implementing extraordinary measures. 39  In 1626 it 
seemed that the Queen mother’s chamber had returned to being the central 
nerve of power, but in reality her dependence to Richelieu was growing. At 
that time, Spanish diplomacy was compromised, along with the Queen Anne 
of Austria, in the conspiracy of Chalais, which aimed to have the cardinal 
assassinated.40 In 1626 Richelieu obtained the executions of Chalais and the 
Count of Montmorency. He also allied himself with Condé, allowing him to 
make his return into the good graces of the court. In 1627, the European 
courts witnessed the reconciliation between Marie of Medici and the devout 
Catholics Pierre de Bérulle and the Marillac brothers.41 The Queen mother 
also allied herself with her daughter-in-law Anne of Austria, and repositioned 
herself as the leader of the discontents. After the King's illness in August 1630, 
both queens tried to arrange for Richelieu to be dismissed. But on 11 
November 1630, the day after the meeting between Louis XIII and Marie of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Thanks to the intervention of his faithful ally, Father Joseph. See Benoît Pierre, Le père 
Joseph, l’éminence grise de Richelieu (Paris: Perrin, 2007), 174. On Richelieu, see Philippe 
Erlanger, Richelieu (Paris: Perrin, 2006).  
37 Dubost, Marie de Médicis, 641. 
38 The reconciliation obliged her to support those intransigents defending the submission of 
the great nobles. This position was at odds with the consensus which would have served her 
interests and also unfavourable to the Protestants. They had supported her consistently and 
saw in her the widow of Henry the Great, who cared for the heritage of a political balance. 
According to Dubost, she did not seem to have perceived the drawback of this new political 
position. Ibidem, 745, 760. 
39 Richelieu placed Claude Bouthillier as Secretary for command, his sister Nicole du Plessis 
as lady-in-waiting, and in 1625, his niece Mme of Combalet in the place of Nicole du Plessis. 
Ibidem, 685-686. 
40 In addition to this, the delay of the Spanish help in support of the siege of La Rochelle, 
which in 1627 had been promised to the French by Olivares, seemed to have heavily 
influence the radicalisation of the Cardinal Richelieu. Cardinal Richelieu to Bérullle, 20 
October 1627, in Les papiers de Richelieu, section politique intérieure. Correspondance et 
papiers d’état, ed. Pierre Grillon (Paris: Pédone, 1975-1979), II, 586. 
41 Dubost, Marie de Médicis, 751. 
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Medici, the latter’s supporters, including Michel of Marillac, were arrested: it 
was the Day of the Dupes.  
 
II.5. 1631-1642: The Factions in Exile, the Reinforcement of the Royal 
Power 
 
Marie of Medici was arrested in Compiègne, on 19 February 1631. She 
subsequently made a strategic error by fleeing to reach the Spanish 
Netherlands 42  with the complicity of her domestic clientele: La Mazure, 
Bernard Potier and Maupas du Tour. As she intended to wage a war against 
her son from abroad, Marie of Medici destroyed her political image in 
France.43 Her supporters were declared guilty of lese-majesty on 12 August 
1631.44 Exile struck the princesses who had encouraged the Queen mother: 
the Princess of Conti, and the duchesses of Elbeuf,45 Ognano and Roannez. 
These three joined Marie of Medici in the Netherlands together with the Duke 
of Vendôme. The Duke of Guise left for Italy, where he died in 1640.  
 
According to Jean-François Dubost, the Queen mother was in the 
Netherlands «suspect in the eyes of every party».46 Olivares was informed that 
Marie of Medici’s followers included many spies, paid by Richelieu.47 Marie of 
Medici suggested some new conspiracies to Spain,48  but she was often 
betrayed by the nobility in exile, who used these plots to negotiate their return 
to France.49 Without money, the Queen mother was no longer a major political 
force and therefore many nobles turned away from her. 
 
France declared war on Spain on 19 May 1635. In the context of a war, 
Marie of Medici could prove a significant asset for Spain in the course of the 
negotiations, all the more as she had found an ally who was a real war leader: 
the Count of Soissons. In addition, after the storming of Corbie in August 1636, 
Philip IV demanded openly to Louis XIII that the Queen mother would be 
reinstalled in her office in France. But the death of the Count of Soissons in 
1641 tipped the balance of power in favour of the French King. Even the 
Potiers returned to France. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 As for them, the Spanish diplomats seemed totally taken aback by Marie of Medici's arrival, 
such as shown by Council of State and the archdukes' messages. Count-Duke of Olivares to 
Philip IV, Madrid, 1638, AHN, E, leg. 869, fos 166-170v; Consulta sobre si la Reina de 
España había de responder a la carta de su madre la Reina de Francia, 1638, AGS, E, 
K1644-D9. 
43 Her belongings and her dower were held: she relied financially only on Philippe IV's 
generosity. Ibidem. 
44 Marillac and Montmorency were executed in 1632. Dubost, Marie de Médicis, 792-793. 
45 Catherine of Bourbon, daughter of Gabrielle d’Estrées.  
46 Dubost, Marie de Médicis, 837.  
47 Ibidem, 831. 
48 Marie de Medici thus suggested taking Calais as well as a revolt in the Languedoc. She 
also sought to negotiate her return to France, playing the card of ecclesiastical mediation by 
Mazarin in July 1635. But the latter torpedoed any request. Ibidem, 821. 
49 Between 1632 and 1635, Marie de Medici lost the support of the Princess of Phalsbourg, of 
Thomas de Savoy, of the Duchess of Ognano and of the Duke of Elbeuf. Ibidem. 
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Spanish diplomacy neglected the Queen mother, who decided to go 
the United Provinces in August 1638.50 But for the Dutch as for the English 
who welcomed her in 1641, the Queen mother had become persona non 
grata, politically of no use, or even embarrassing, because she was heavily in 
debt. The Grand Duke of Tuscany Ferdinand II was the only one who 
accepted to receive her, in 1642. She died on the road from Cologne, before 
setting foot on Italian ground. 
 
Marie of Medici ceaselessly shifted her alliances: as a queen first and 
then as a regent; as party leader, she even went as far as to threaten the 
royal power of her son. Her progress illustrated how the game of factions at 
the court did not solely operate around the female sovereigns. The next 
Queen of France, Anne of Austria, was no exception to this. 
 
 
III. The Parties at the Court of Anne of Austria  
 
III.1. 1615-1638: The Party of the Victims of Richelieu 
 
In 1615, the Princes of the Blood’ opposition to the Spanish marriages 
impeded the triumphal arrival of Anne of Austria to the court. Her position at 
court was also weakened by the infertility of the royal couple, which Anne of 
Austria harshly experienced.51 The King's hostility towards his spouse was 
also promoted by her too numerous trail of Spanish servants and the 
privileges she had granted the Spanish ambassador – while Princess 
Elisabeth in Madrid was not allowed to guarantee the same privileges.52 Anne 
of Austria also proved reckless as she compromised her reputation because 
of the Duke of Buckingham’s affair and was involved in the Chalais 
conspiracy.53 Marie of Medici’s jealousy and distrust also meant that the new 
Queen could not easily find her place at the court of France.54 In 1615 the 
opponents to the Queen mother had their leader, Condé, and sporadically 
Gaston of Orléans. The others, such as Luynes, woo the King with the hope 
of obtaining Concini’s fall. At that time, Anne of Austria was at the margin of 
the struggles between factions.  
 
It was only with the assassination of Concini and the exile of the Queen 
mother to Blois in 1617 that Anne of Austria’s rank at court was truly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 John Evelyn, The Diary of John Evelyn (London: Everyman, 2006), 39. 
51 Her miscarriage in 1622 created tensions in the couple. Laurent Avezou, “Les deux reines. 
Anne d’Autriche au miroir de son temps," in Grell, Anne d’Autriche, 325. 
52 Philip III to Duke of Monteleón, AGS, K1454, fol. 78; Marquis of Mirabel to Philip III, Paris, 
14 November 1620, AGS, K1454, fol. 148; Philip III to Louis XIII, 24 November 1620, AGS 
K1455, fol. 190. See also María José del Río Barredo and Jean-François Dubost, "La 
présence étrangère autour d’Anne d’Autriche (1615-1666),” in Grell, Anne d’Autriche, 120-121. 
53 Jean-François Dubost, "Anne d’Autriche, reine de France: mise en perspective et bilan 
politique du règne (1615-1666),” in Grell, Anne d’Autriche, 45. 
54 Instead of enjoying the first rank after her husband in monarchical ceremonies, she must 
surrender that place to her mother-in-law. See Dubost, "Anne d’Autriche”, 43. 
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recognised. In 1620 Louis XIII entrusted her with regency in absentia,55 while 
he waged the latest war against his mother. The reconciliation between 
mother and son sent Anne of Austria back to absolute «political nothingness» 
among the French elites until 1628.56 Her incapacity to give an heir to the King 
was the main factor: indeed, who would have invested in a potentially 
repudiable Queen?  
 
Nonetheless, from 1628 common hostility against Richelieu reconciled 
Anne of Austria and Marie of Medici.57 In 1631, following the Day of the Dupes, 
the exile of the Queen mother and then of Gaston of Orléans, made Anne of 
Austria appear as a suitable leader for the opponents to Richelieu. This 
perspective was summarised by La Rochefoucauld: «To me, the domination 
of Cardinal of Richelieu was unfair. I thought that the Queen's party was the 
only one that was honest and that one could follow».58 
 
Behind the word “unfair” is the idea of a strong preoccupation among 
factions to find a new opposition’s leader and the fear to disappear from the 
chessboard of Court’s power. Thus, the Queen was at the head of a party by 
default and not because of any personal effort on her part: this was a major 
difference from Marie of Medici. Anne of Austria also enjoyed a narrower 
margin of manoeuvre at the court than her mother-in-law: in 1626, Richelieu 
ensured that she could neither nominate anyone in her household nor 
promote any servant; her financial autonomy was also more limited than 
Marie de Medici’s.59 The Duchess of Chevreuse was her main ally: she acted 
under the pseudonym of «la Chevrette»60 as a spy inside and outside the 
Court with all the opponents to the Cardinal. Richelieu arranged for the 
duchess to be exiled to Touraine in 1631. In 1637, Richelieu disclosed to the 
King the secret correspondence between Anne of Austria and the Duchess of 
Chevreuse as well as and with her brothers, Philip IV and the Cardinal-Infant, 
at the very time when France had been at war against Spain for two years.61  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 The regency in absentia of 1636 was purely symbolic: Louis XIII, at war against his mother, 
did not have anyone else to whom he could entrust the kingdom. The Queen was under the 
supervision of a council of ministers. Ibidem. 
56 Alain Hugon highlights that the Spanish ambassador, Mirabel, no longer had the possibility 
to access her rooms. In addition, her diplomatic correspondence gives an account of the 
court's hostility towards the Queen and rumours of marriage’s cancellation in the absence of 
an heir. Hugon, Au service du roi catholique, 194. See also the letters of Marquis of Mirabel 
and Navaz, March-April 1629, AGS, K1437, fol. 75.  
57 The irony is that this reconciliation had been wanted and initiated by the cardinal, to bring 
back harmony among the royal couple, solve the issue of the conception of an heir and put an 
end to any claim of Gaston of Orléans to the throne. Dubost, "Anne d’Autriche”, 45.  
58 Duke of La Rochefoucauld, Mémoires, in his Œuvres complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), 
46. 
59 According to Jean-François Dubost, what made the revolts of Marie of Medici possible were 
the financial opportunities which she could dispose of. The income from her dower and 
annuities increased her solvency and allowed her to borrow money at favourable terms. 
Richelieu will not forget it to later neutralise Anne of Austria. Dubost, Marie de Médicis, 253, 
616. 
60  Duchess of Chevreuse to the Count-Duke of Olivares, n. d., AAE, Correspondance 
diplomatique, Espagne, vol. 6, leg. 3. 
61 Dubost, "Anne d’Autriche”, 49. 
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III.2. 1638-1651: The Regency: the Regency and the Fronde 
 
Fortunately for the Queen, the birth of Louis Dieudonné on 5 
September 1638 at last established Anne of Austria in her role and status as 
Queen of France. The birth of Philippe, two years later, sanctioned the 
naturalisation of Anne of Austria in the eyes of the French. From that moment 
onwards, her political positioning progressed towards the defence of her son's 
interest and therefore she reconciled with Richelieu. In 1642 the conspiracy of 
Cinq-Mars projected the assassination of the cardinal and involved Gaston of 
Orléans, the Duke of Bouillon, Cinq-Mars and La Rochefoucauld, with the 
backup of Spain. La Rochefoucauld suspected the Queen to have transmitted 
to Richelieu a copy of the Madrid treaty which revealed the scope of the 
conspiracy: 
 
The circumstances which led to the disclosure of that terrible 
Spanish treaty remain uncertain and, without limiting myself to 
the various suspicions which hung over the loyalty or the silence 
of those who knew about it, it is preferable to choose an 
innocent opinion and believe that this treaty was found in the 
mail suitcase from Spain, which is nearly always opened when it 
travels through Paris.62 
 
After Louis XIII’s death on 14 May 1643, Anne of Austria became the 
regent of the kingdom.63  The deceased King had organised the regency 
according to the model of regency in absentia by placing the Queen under the 
ministers’ political supervision.64 Anne of Austria did not agree that the King's 
power, which she exercised in his name, should be shared: on 18 May 1643, 
she had Louis XIV hold his first Lit de Justice in order that he would revoke his 
father's will and restore the absolute power of the queen in her capacity as 
regent. 
 
The rivalries between factions had changed in comparison to Marie de 
Medici's regency. At that time rebellions were a good business: Henri, Prince 
of Condé, negotiated at a high price the balance of power with the royal power. 
By contrast, under Richelieu rebellion resulted in decapitation, as that of the 
Count of Montmorency. Richelieu had consequently raised both a strong 
opposition and great loyalties, including that of the Prince of Condé, in 1626-
27.65 The Guises supported Anne of Austria, because she came from the 
Habsburg house and they were favourable to a political line which promoted 
both peace between Catholics and the stability of the kingdom. Thus, thanks 
to the intransigence of Richelieu to submit the factions to the State, Anne of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 La Rochefoucauld, Mémoires, 56-57. 
63 Gaston of Orléans had discredited himself in the eyes of Louis XIII by his repeated 
rebellions. Dubost, “Anne d’Autriche”, 55. 
64 The Coucil was composed by Gaston of Orléans, Henri Prince of Condé and the men in 
government, Mazarin, Séguier, Bouthillier and Chavigny, all allies of Richelieu. Ibidem, 56. 
65 On that point, see the studies of Arlette Jouanna, Le devoir de révolte.	   La noblesse 
française et la gestation de l'Etat moderne (1559-1661) (Paris: Fayard, 1989) and Katia 
Beguin, Les princes de Condé: rebelles, courtisans et mécènes dans la France du Grand 
Siècle (Seyssel: Champ Vallon, 1999).  
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Austria began her regency under good auspices as she could rely on the 
support of the two main rival clans at court.  
 
Initially, the Queen sought a consensus and called back the exiled who 
were the former opponents to Richelieu: Marshal Bassompierre, the Marquis 
of La Vieuville, the Duke of Elbeuf, the Duchess of Chevreuse, the Duke of La 
Valette, Fontrailles. Their leader was the Duke of Beaufort, the son of the 
Duke of Vendôme.66 
 
As highlighted by Jean-François Dubost, 67  while Marie of Medici 
wanted to identify her action with the defence of peace, Anne of Austria 
established hers on dynastic defence, which compelled her to continue 
Richelieu's politics. In a favourable context to the French68, the Regent took 
the decision to continue the war against her own family, the Habsburg.69 But 
the pursue of this political line also compelled Anne of Austria to support the 
next minister nominated by Louis XIII, Cardinal Mazarin.70 This decision was 
particularly misunderstood by her exiled supporters, who tried to plot so that 
Mazarin would fall. Anne of Austria responded by arresting the Duke of 
Beaufort, on 2 September 1643. Here is a new difference of reaction: where 
Marie of Medici tried to buy the opposition, Anne of Austria chose 
intransigence following the manners of Richelieu.71 As a consequence, the 
group of discontents could unify their complains: ingratitude was consequently 
the reason for the former allies of the Queen - La Rochefoucauld and the 
Duchess of Chevreuse - to rebel against her. 
 
From the beginning of the conflicts, the political legitimacy of Anne of 
Austria was openly contested by the mazarinades (5500 pamphlets written in 
five years).72 The Regent also suffered from the bad image of Marie of Medici 
due to the propaganda organised by Richelieu to discredit female power but, 
unlike Marie de Medici, Anne of Austria decided not to fight the propaganda 
war and refused to justify her action.73 She did not have the same finances 
available to Marie de Medici in order to build a clientele, so she tried to resort 
to a multiplicity of honours. Between 1648 and 1652 she created twenty duke-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Dubost, "Anne d’Autriche”, 65-66. 
67 Ibidem, 86. 
68 Indeed, in 1648, peace in Westphalia freed France of a war with the Emperor. Louis XIV 
had obtained the recognition of French sovereignty over the three bishoprics which had been 
occupied since 1552 and of his feudal rights over the landgraviate of lower Alsace. However, 
Spain refused to deal with France. Ibidem, 69. 
69 The famous sentence uttered by Anne of Austria when she joined Philip IV on the occasion 
of Louis XIV's wedding in 1660, followed naturally in the wake of this political line: «May your 
Majesty forgive me for being such a good French woman, I owed it to the King, my son and to 
France». According to Fanny Cosandey, beyond the humility of the wording, the real office of 
the queens of France was summarised: to devout themselves to the kingdom and to the King, 
whether he was a spouse or a son. Fanny Cosandey, “Reines de France, héritières 
espagnoles,” in Les cours d’Espagne et de France au XVIIe siècle, eds. Chantal Grell and 
Benoît Pellistrandi (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2007), 61-76.  
70 See also the biography by Claude Dulong, Mazarin (Paris: Perrin, 2010). 
71 Grell, Anne d’Autriche, 66. 
72 Ibidem, 82. 
73 Avezou, “Les deux reines”, 342. 
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peerages (a dignity hereditary in the masculine line) and one simple duchy,74 
which opened access to the duchy to certain families originating in the nobility 
of the robe, such as the Potiers and the Villeroys.75 In times of crisis, the 
Marshal's baton was another way to reward outstanding war leaders such as 
Turenne in 1643 and Plessis-Praslin in 1645.76  
 
Between June 1648 and 1649 the Fronde essentially concerned 
political and administrative claims made by members of the Parliament.77 It 
consisted of rebellions with little organisation or structure that were repressed 
by the Prince Louis of Condé, who successfully led the siege of Paris between 
January and March 1649. The strategy of civil war which was adopted in 1649 
proved efficient to rally urban financial circles to the Queen's party, seen that 
the rebels were engaging in systematic looting.78 
 
The second phase of the Fronde (March 1649-1651) was called «the 
Fronde of the princes» and relied on the discontentment of the Prince of 
Condé, who felt insufficiently rewarded for his efforts. 79  Once again, 
ingratitude was the cause for important changes in the political chessboard. 
Indeed, Mazarin had begun to build a network of loyal followers and he 
exercised his patronage above all in the military to the detriment of Condé’s 
influence. Condé succeeded in gathering behind him various powerful social 
groups of opponents: the parliaments, the state nobility, the towns’ 
corporations and the representatives of the high nobility. During that time, part 
of the allies engaged in negotiations, betrayed the alliance, struggled against 
their former allies and occasionally joined them.80 Each of these groups was 
animated by the desire to weak the King's position but at the same time each 
feared to reinforce the position of a rival faction. 
 
In January 1649, the royal family left Paris to flee to Saint-Germain-en-
Laye: it was the eve of Twelfth-Night. Condé defeated the royal army in the 
Faubourg Saint-Antoine and the bourgeois of Paris opened him the city’s 
doors. When he entrusted his friends and supporters with some important 
posts, some divisions emerged. The parliament of Paris split between the 
«jusqu'aux-boutistes» and the moderates who were favourable to negotiating 
with the Regent. In January 1650, Anne of Austria got Condé arrested as well 
as his brother Conti and their brother-in-law, the Duke of Longueville. In 
January 1651, Gaston of Orléans joined the party of the princes and Mazarin 
went away to Cologne, from where he continued to advise Anne of Austria.81 
The political crisis of that second phase was played between various parties: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Grell, Anne d’Autriche, 83. 
75 The quarrels of precedence which resulted at the court of Anne of Austria were mocked in 
the mazarinades. BNF, mss Clairambault, 718, fol. 159. See also Fanny Cosandey's analysis 
about this episode: Fanny Cosandey, “Les préséances à la cour des reines de France,” in 
Poutrin and Schaub, Femmes et pouvoir politique, 267-278. 
76 Grell, Anne d’Autriche, 83. 
77 See the studies of Robert Descimon and Christian Jouhaud, La France du premier XVIIe 
siècle (Paris: Belin, 1996), ch. 6. 
78 Grell, Anne d’Autriche, 85. 
79 Ibidem, 67-69. 
80 Elias, La société de cour, 190. 
81 Grell, Anne d’Autriche, 74. 
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the parliament, the Cardinal of Retz, the princes, and the party of Anne of 
Austria/Mazarin. The Cardinal of Retz believed that he could supersede 
Mazarin; the Prince of Condé claimed that he had no intention to reform the 
state but as a prince of the blood he intended to replace Mazarin as regent.82 
Mazarin presented his party as the King's and that of political legitimacy even 
though he acted like a great noble, by defending his interests and his clientele. 
 
Each party sought to triumph in order to impose their vision of the 
power and for that purpose they did not hesitate to compromise yesterday's 
alliances. The strategy of Anne of Austria's party was to save time until Louis 
XIV would come of age and approve the Regent's measures.  
 
III.3. 1651-1666: the Triumph of the Queen's Party and of Mazarin 
 
In order to avoid for Louis XIV to become hostile to them as Louis XIII 
had been towards Concini, Mazarin and Anne of Austria chose very early to 
initiate Louis XIV to the affairs of the kingdom. In December 1651, Louis XIV 
reached his majority and agreed with Anne of Austria to recall Mazarin. The 
consequence was named «the Union of both Frondes». The opposition was 
this time directed against Louis XIV.83 Paris’s Hôtel de Ville was ransacked by 
the supporters of the Prince of Condé in July 1652, but the war was unpopular 
and, without financial support, the rebels divided: Condé, Gaston of Orléans 
and the parliament were competing for power while the countryside was 
plundered and beggars flowed into towns.84 The King's support to Mazarin, 
the lack of popularity of rebellions and the faltering support from abroad – 
Spain itself was at war against France and its poor finances did not allow 
providing much help to the opposition – forced Condé to exile. On 13 October 
he travelled to the Spanish Netherlands in order to join the service of Philip IV, 
who immediately promoted him generalissimo of his troupes in the 
Netherlands.85 The population of Paris gave in to the sovereigns and Mazarin 
recovered his position at the head of the government in February 1653.  
 
The same year, Mazarin called all his family from Rome to naturalise 
them French and one of his nieces married the Prince of Conti. Conti had 
seemed to draw the lessons from the failure of his brother Condé and 
declared his allegiance to Mazarin.86 Anne of Austria obtained the ratification 
from the parliament for the naturalisation of Mazarin and his role as the 
protector of the state during the Fronde. The party of Mazarin and Anne of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 According to Guy Joly, Condé «only aims to make himself the absolute master of the 
cabinet and business». Ibidem, 80 
83 The Lit de justice held on 22 October 1652 by the King in the Louvre in front of the 
parliament cancelled all legislation passed during the Fronde. Grell, Anne d’Autriche, 82-83. 
84 Christian Jouhaud, “Révoltes et contestations d’Ancien Régime,” in Histoire de la France, 
l’État et les conflits, ed. André Bouguieres and Jacques Revel (Paris: Seuil, 1990), 44. 
85 The parliament of Paris declared Condé guilty of lese-majesty, condemned him to capital 
sentence in absentia and confiscated all his properties and offices to the King's profit. Grell, 
Anne d’Autriche, 86. 
86 As a reward Conti was nominated governor of Champagne, generalissimo of the King's 
army in Languedoc and at the death of Gaston of Orléans in 1660, he took over after him as 
the governor of Languedoc. His wife was chosen in March 1661 to the office of 
superintendent of the House and Finances of Anne of Austria. Grell, Anne d’Autriche, 87. 
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Austria had triumphed not only by arms but also by law, since it had 
succeeded in asserting itself as the party of the State.87 Indeed, this party 
succeeded in shifting the contractual relationship uniting the King and his 
subjects from «financed compliance» with the power towards «privilege which 
was purchased by the subjects and which included granting compliance and 
financial support to the King».88 
 
The unity of the Bourbon family was reinforced by the latest diplomatic 
triumph of Anne of Austria: the marriage between Louis XIV and the eldest 
Spanish infanta, Maria Theresa of Austria, in 1660.89 Anne’s withdrawal from 
politics in 1661, when Mazarin passed away, allowed her to revive her image 
as the ideal regent, who withdraws from politics as soon as her mission of 






The grand nobles, a limited circle linked to royalty,90 were those who 
set themselves up as the protectors of the nobility91 and determined the 
interactions of the political parties at court, including the Queen's party. What 
characterised the identity of these parties at the court were their motivations 
regarding personal interest, lineage or faction. At the same time, these family 
networks were not immutable or closed, because they participated in the 
process of historical changes: the key to their continuity resided in their 
capacity to adapt to changing circumstances. Thus, in most cases, as for the 
princes of Condé, the opposition could choose to become loyal to royal power. 
  
Ingratitude was the reason put forward by many rebels or spies for 
changing party and/or to become an ally of Spain. Nonetheless, the many 
troubles or internal revolts were neither organised nor thought out in the long 
term, but they tested the balance of power and reminded to the Crown what it 
owed to the nobility.92 If it is true that the term of loyalty implied the notion of 
allegiance, the religious origins of the nobility’s acceptance compelled it to 
duties towards the King. The aristocrats who plotted with Spain failed their 
duty of vassalage in order to form «factions composed of clienteles», 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Ibidem, 88. 
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89 According to Jean-François Dubost, Anne of Austria then experienced the satisfaction to 
marry her son in her own house which in her eyes was the only alliance worthy of the King, 
the one which paved the way for France to seize the Spanish inheritance. The alliance with 
Cromwell's England, in 1655, compelled Philip IV to sign the Pyrenees peace treaty, to the 
advantage of France. This peace was ratified by the marriage of the eldest infanta Maria-
Theresa with Louis XIV, in 1660. Ibidem. 
90 Elias, La société de cour, 189. 
91 Ibidem, 193. 
92 Gaston of Orléans's words in a letter to the King of Spain, accurately summarised the 
position of the nobles on that point: the Spanish support was accepted but in case the armies 
of the Catholic King entered France «all will turn against him and himself [Sir], while being so 
obliged to V.M. will be forced to oppose him because if he does not do it, this will outrage all 
of France against the Duke of Orléans.» Consultation of the Council of State, March 1632, 
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according to the expression of Yves Durand,93 unlike at the time of religious 
wars. The period studied here reveals how the sense of treason was still 
under-developed among top nobles of the kingdom and the royal family if one 
considers Marie of Medici: they claimed to act out of a duty of rebellion 
against a supposed tyranny. Yet, the question of the boundary between 
tyranny and monarchy was not well defined. For the nobility, ingratitude and 
the hogging of honours by a minister were elements of despotism.94 
 
Marie de Medici and Anne of Austria maintained extremely variable 
relationships with the parties at court. Complacent towards opponents when 
the queens were politically isolated, they became intransigent when they had 
the responsibility to exercise their power as regents. At the time of Marie of 
Medici, divisions in the Bourbon family eased the development of court 
factions. Richelieu’s actions and the hardship of civil war allowed the policy of 
Anne of Austria to triumph. As a consequence, the Bourbon family became 
more united and the submission of the parties to royal power was ratified 
against pensions and honours which granted its protection against socio-
economical changes. At the end of these regencies, rivalries between factions 
remained, but the balance of their power compared to royal authority was 
deeply transformed into the basis for an absolute monarchy. 
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(Paris: PUF, 1981), 3-24. 
94 Nonetheless the high nobility was rarely condemned for high treason, because royal power 
needed them for its own prestige. The same was not true for their servants. Hugon, Au 
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